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Abstract
There has been a phenomenal global increase in the proportion of women in politics
in the last two decades, but there is no evidence of how this influences economic perfor-
mance. We investigate this using data on competitive elections to India’s state assemblies,
leveraging close elections to isolate causal effects. We find significantly higher growth in
economic activity in constituencies that elect women and no evidence of negative spillovers
to neighbouring male-led constituencies, consistent with net growth. Probing mechanisms,
we find evidence consistent with women legislators being more efficacious, less corrupt and
less vulnerable to political opportunism.
Keywords: Political representation, identity, India, gender, women legislators, economic
growth, luminosity, corruption, roads, close elections, electoral incentives
JEL codes: D72, D78, H44, H73
∗All errors are our own. UNU-WIDER Helsinki invited this study in connection with our Keynote Address
at the 17th Nordic Conference on Development Economics. We acknowledge support from the International
Growth Center for the project “Female politicians and economic growth” (IGC G2015-73). Bhalotra acknowl-
edges partial support from ESRC Grants ES/L009153/1 and ES/S003681/1 awarded to the Research Centre
for Micro-Social Change at ISER, University of Essex. We are grateful to Ray Fisman, Siddharth George and
Dan Keniston for sharing their data with us, and to Sam Asher, Irma Clots-Figueras, Lakshmi Iyer and Paul
Novosad for useful discussions.
1 Introduction
More than a hundred countries have introduced quotas for women in parliament or in party
lists in the last two decades (Pande and Ford, 2012; Besley et al., 2017; Dahlerup, 2006) and
the percentage of women in parliament worldwide has more than doubled, standing at 25.2
percent in October 2020.1 The feminization of politics is one of the most exciting political
phenomena of our time. Yet, we do not know what it portends for growth, the rising tide
that is thought to lift all boats. In this paper we present the first systematic examination of
whether women politicians are good for economic growth.
The association of women with redistributive policies and a tolerance of higher taxes (Ed-
lund and Pande, 2002; Edlund et al., 2005; Campbell, 2004) makes it plausible that, at least
in the short to medium term, women politicians are less effective than men at promoting
growth. Women have been shown to favour public goods investments, such as in education
and health (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Clots-Figueras, 2012), which may have only
long term returns. However, women legislators might promote growth if women who select
into public office have a stronger sense of public mission, are more motivated to meet higher
expectations, or are less corrupt (Beaman et al., 2006; Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Dollar et al.,
2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Mauro, 1995; Prakash et al., 2019).2
We know of no causal estimates linking economic performance to the gender of politicians,
but a few recent studies examine impacts on firm performance of women on corporate boards.
The results of these studies are ambiguous, suggesting negative impacts or no impact (Ahern
and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2014). However, this
evidence base is too small to be conclusive, and the gender composition of decision makers
may influence economic performance differently in the political and corporate sectors.
Two factors probably contribute to the scarcity of causal evidence on the relationship
between legislator gender and economic performance. First, annual constituency level data
on economic activity are not available in most countries. We use satellite imagery of nighttime
luminosity as a measure of growth in economic activity following Henderson et al. (2012), Chen
and Nordhaus (2011), Costinot et al. (2016), Donaldson and Storeygard (2016), and Bruederle
and Hodler (2018).3 The second constraint is that constituencies in which women win elections
may be systematically different in ways that may be correlated with economic performance.
To isolate the role of legislator gender from voter preferences and other potentially omitted
variables at the constituency level, we use a regression discontinuity design on close elections
1In contrast, only 12 percent of corporate board members are women.
2See, for instance, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryhannon/2010/11/19/top-five-reasons-why-women-
flock-to-nonprofit-jobs/).
3We demonstrate a positive association of nighttime luminosity growth with GDP growth using available
state-level data for India. We investigate sensitivity of our estimates to three potential sources of measurement
error in the use of night time lights to estimate economic activity: saturation, low sensitivity and blooming.
As discussed below, we also show that women are more effective than men at overseeing road building and at
raising the share of non-farm employment, an important indicator of economic progress in developing countries.
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between men and women. In first-past-the-post elections in which the winner takes all, there
is a sharp discontinuity at the zero vote margin between the top two candidates. In this
setting, the identity (and hence gender) of the winner can be considered quasi-random (Lee,
2008; Eggers et al., 2015; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Comparing constituencies in which
a woman wins against a man by a narrow margin (‘treated’) with those in which a man
wins against a woman by a narrow margin (‘control’) can thus isolate the causal influence of
legislator gender.
We examine data for 4265 state assembly constituencies for 1992–2012, during which time
most states had four elections. This is a period of strong economic growth in India. It was
also a period in which the share of female state legislators increased from about 4.5 percent to
close to 8 percent. Moreover, there was vast regional variation in both the gender composition
of state legislators and luminosity growth (see Figures A.1 and A.2).
We find that women legislators in India raise economic performance in their constituencies
by 2.3 percentage points per year more than male legislators.4 If women-led constituencies do
better on account of winning resources away from male-led constituencies, then overall impacts
on economic growth of increasing the share of women legislators would depend upon the size
of these negative spillovers. Assessing this by mapping growth in neighbouring constituencies
to legislator gender in the index constituency, we reject negative spillovers.5
In probing mechanisms, we find evidence consistent with women legislators being more
effective, in particular, more likely to achieve completion of infrastructure projects. We also
find women leaders are less corrupt, using two different indicators of corruption.6 In consid-
ering external validity of the RD estimates, we find evidence consistent with women being
less prone to distortions arising from electoral incentives. We investigate the constituency
level share of non-farm employment as an alternative proxy for economic growth, and again
we find that women outperform men, raising this share by 0.84% points per year.7
We now elaborate this evidence. Since economic infrastructure is an important input to
economic growth, especially in developing countries (Jacoby, 2000a), we analyzed legislator
performance in implementation of a massive federally-funded village road construction pro-
gram involving state legislators bidding for federal funds and delivering goods at the local
4Our estimates indicate that luminosity growth is about 15 percentage points higher in female-led than in
male-led constituencies. We estimate the GDP-luminosity elasticity from Indian state level data and use this
to translate the marginal effect into GDP growth. In a panel data model with state fixed effects, the elasticity
is 0.38 but conditional on year fixed effects it is 0.15. We use an elasticity of 0.15 for the conversion. The
resulting figure of 2.3% points corresponds to about 32% of the growth rate of GDP in the sample period.
5The estimated coefficient, though imprecise, is positive, consistent with yardstick competition between
neighbours (Besley and Case, 1995) and with positive externalities of public infrastructure like electricity and
roads for neighbours, for instance, infrastructure does not stop abruptly at constituency boundaries.
6 These results are consistent with women achieving higher growth without necessarily bringing more
resources from the state to their constituencies.
7These additional results allay the potential concern that what we capture is simply that luminosity growth
is stronger under women because they are more likely to invest in street lighting, with a view to ensuring the
safety of women in public places.
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level. Using administrative programme data we find that, although male and female politi-
cians are equally likely to negotiate federal projects for road building in their constituencies,
women are more likely to oversee completion of these projects. The share of incomplete
road projects in woman-led constituencies is 22 percentage points lower than in male-led
constituencies, a mechanism that plausibly contributes to the better growth performance of
woman-led constituencies. Like George (2019), we interpret the share of projects completed
vs stalled as a measure of politician effort. Since road construction has higher returns for
men (Asher and Novosad, 2019), this finding also establishes that women politicians are not
exclusively focused upon serving the interests of women voters, which is where the current
evidence points.8
To investigate corruption, we use asset growth in office, a measure devised and validated
in Fisman et al. (2014). We find that the rate at which women accumulate assets while
in office is 12 percentage points lower per annum than for men. We analyse an alternative
measure of (potential) corruption that is measured before the legislator enters office, which is
an indicator for whether the contestant has pending criminal charges against them. Following
Prakash et al. (2019), we estimate the growth penalty associated with criminal legislators on
our sample. Using this parameter, we estimate that criminal tendencies can explain close to
one fourth of the identified difference in growth between male and female-led constituencies.9
The data satisfy a suite of checks indicating that the RD estimates are internally valid. We
show that there is no evidence of sorting at the threshold, and that a rich set of constituency-
level pre-determined electoral and demographic covariates are balanced around the thresh-
old. This mitigates concerns that the estimates are driven by pre-existing differences in con-
stituency characteristics, in particular the weaker performance of men cannot be attributed
to mean reversion or to their being elected in places with weaker growth potential. Since
unobservable imbalance between constituencies with female and male legislators will tend
to be smaller among neighbouring constituencies, we re-estimate the main equation limiting
the estimation sample to constituencies with female legislators and their neighbours (mostly
male-led). The coefficient of interest is almost identical, suggesting balance on unobservables
in the original sample.
In considering the external validity of our results it is important to highlight that a third
of all mixed-gender races are won with narrow margins (i.e. are in the close election sample).
8For instance, see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Iyer et al. (2012); Brollo and Troiano (2016); Bhalotra
and Clots-Figueras (2014); Clots-Figueras (2012); Miller (2007); Edlund et al. (2005); Chaney et al. (1998);
Thomas (1991); Svaleryd (2009); Bhalotra et al. (2017, 2019). Amongst the findings of these studies are that
women in politics have influenced the passage of abortion laws in the US, equal inheritance rights legislation,
the reporting of crime against women, and the promotion of public health inputs to child survival in India; gov-
ernment spending on childcare, expenditures on education and elderly care in Sweden; and maternal mortality
decline in developing countries. A few studies find no significant influence of the gender of local politicians on
policy choices (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014; Rigon and Tanzi, 2012).
9Neither Fisman et al. (2014) nor Prakash et al. (2019) look at legislator gender.
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Although estimates outside the RD bandwidth are potentially contaminated by selection,
they indicate that men who win against women with wide (non-close) margins achieve growth
rates similar to women (note that there is no victory margin at which men do better). This
suggests that men who win against women with narrow margins may be negatively selected
relative to men who win against women with wide margins. We find no significant difference
in constituency or candidate characteristics between these two groups of men, except that men
winning in close elections are more likely to have dynastic links. Since dynasts are less effective
leaders over an election term (George, 2019), this may contribute to the better performance
of men further away from the RD threshold. However, dynastic links cannot explain the
better performance of women because, in the close election sample, men and women are
equally likely to be dynasts.10 To investigate whether men who win in close elections are
negatively selected on unobservables, we adapt a strategy suggested in George (2019), using
swings in the state-level vote share of the candidate’s party as a measure of luck. Candidates
who narrowly win when their party faces a positive swing are poorer quality candidates than
those who win by a narrow margin when their party faces a negative swing. We show that our
results are robust to accounting for negative selection among men in close elections. Even if
we focus only on higher quality candidates (who won despite a negative party swing), women
outperform men.
To explain why women appear to do no better than men (though no worse) in non-close
elections while decisively doing better in close elections, we highlight that electoral incentives
are sharper in close than in non-close election constituencies, and posit that men and women
respond differently to these incentives. In particular, women are less likely than men to distort
economic policies to pursue a narrow electoral agenda. We provide descriptive evidence
consistent with this, showing that re-election rates for women vs men are lower in close
elections, while being similar in non-close elections.11
We contribute new evidence to a literature on political identity and substantive represen-
tation (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) that has tended to focus more
narrowly upon differences in priorities and hence on the composition of government spend-
ing, rather than on growth. This is relevant as this is a time when women are increasingly
participating in government across the globe. In India, a historic constitutional amendment
proposing to reserve one third of all federal and state assembly seats for women was passed by
the upper house of the federal parliament in 2010. However, it was not voted on in the lower
10We are grateful to Siddhartha George for sharing his data on dynastic links.
11Re-election rates of women in close elections are similar to the re-election rates of men and women in
non-close elections. Consistent with the pattern of growth results, the re-election rate of men in close elections
is distinctly higher. These findings cohere with our earlier analysis of mechanisms for behaviour within the
close sample, consistent with women having greater intrinsic motivation. Other studies have highlighted the
potential for electoral incentives to distort economic choices, e. g. generating electoral cycles (Cole, 2009), vote
buying (Mitra et al., 2017), or pork-barrel politics (Arulampalam et al., 2009) but with the exception of Brollo
and Troiano (2016), these studies do not distinguish men and women.
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house and lapsed in 2014.12 Our findings are of considerable interest beyond India, given
the scarcity of evidence on the question of how legislator gender is associated with economic
performance, and in view of the fact that the share of women in government is small but ris-
ing in many (rich and poor) countries. In addition to contributing the first causal estimates
indicating how election of a female vs male legislator influences luminosity growth, we also
provide new causal evidence on how legislator gender influences road infrastructure, sectoral
change and corruption and we present evidence suggesting that men and women respond
differently to electoral incentives. We conclude the paper with remarks on how the growth
premium associated with women leaders might evolve with economic development.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers contextual information
on Indian elections and women’s political participation. Section 3 presents our empirical
strategy. In Section 4, we discuss the electoral, luminosity, road building and candidate
characteristics data. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 explores geographical
spillovers. In Section 7, we investigate mechanisms. Section 8 presents a number of extensions,
and section 9 concludes.
2 Context
India is a large federal country with highly competitive multi-party elections monitored by
an independent electoral commission. Electoral fraud is uncommon, although some areas
suffer from clientelism and elite capture (Anderson et al., 2015). The current 29 states of the
Indian Union are parliamentary democracies in which, typically, a new legislative assembly
is elected every five years. There is a high degree of turnover at the state level with state
governments often voted out of office. In contrast to the case of the USA, but similar to
Brazil, incumbents in India are less likely to win than challengers (Uppal, 2009). Members
of Legislative Assemblies (legislators) are chosen according to a first-past-the-post system in
single member constituencies. Voters vote for individual candidates rather than party lists.
Successful candidates are typically fielded by an established party.13 While there are political
quotas for certain minority tribes and castes at the local, state and national level, gender
quotas in India are only at the local level (village, town) and only since 1993 (Chattopadhyay
and Duflo, 2004).
12A constitutional amendment mandating that a random one third of village council leader positions be
reserved for women was passed in India in 1993. A number of studies analyse these reservations, for example,
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Beaman et al. (2009); Afridi et al. (2017). This study is different because (a)
Women winning in competitive elections are not comparable to women elected to reserved seats, and village
government in India operates very differently from state government and (b) previous studies have focused
upon the composition of government spending.
13In fact, parties are crucial arbiters of political careers given the high costs of running for office in India. In
the 2009 federal elections, the average cost of winning a seat was around 2 million US dollars (Tiwari, 2014),
a sum that most candidates would struggle to raise without the support of sophisticated party organizations.
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State legislators shape policy. They influence the flow of federal funds and the financing
of village councils and they are responsible, inter alia, for roads, electricity, law and order,
health and education. Political manipulations by state governments can influence the allo-
cation of federal transfers (Khemani, 2006) and of federally funded development programs
(Gupta and Mukhopadhyay, 2016). Legislators can also influence economic conditions in
their constituencies by, for instance, improving the supply of public services (Baskaran et al.,
2015; Min, 2015), attracting pork by lobbying the state government, exerting effort to pursue
development opportunities, and implementing federal or state government programs more or
less effectively.
Evidence emerging from political quotas in village and town councils and analysis of close
elections to state assemblies suggest that women politicians have different priorities from men,
tending to favor the concerns of women and children (see references in Section 1). Despite
a secular increase in the share of women legislators, women remain vastly under-represented
in Indian federal and state politics, their share oscillating around 10 percent in recent years
(Beaman et al., 2012). This reflects not so much lower chances of winning conditional on
standing, but that fewer women come forward as candidates (Bhalotra et al., 2017). This
may be because women dislike competitive or corrupt environments or because party leaders
discriminate against women in the nomination process (Spary, 2014).
3 Empirical Strategy
We aim to estimate the causal effect of election of a woman legislator on economic activity
in her constituency. If the election of women was randomly determined, constituencies that
elected a man would serve as a valid counterfactual. However, the election of women is unlikely
to be random. For instance, one might expect that constituencies with more progressive voters
are more likely to elect women. This creates the identification challenge that unobserved
differences between constituencies that elect women vs. men are potentially correlated with
the outcome (economic activity).
To address this challenge, we exploit the discontinuity in electoral outcomes that arises in
first-past-the-post electoral systems by comparing female and male winners in close elections,
defined as elections in which the margin of victory between the winner and the runner-up
is arbitrarily small. Previous work shows that, in these circumstances, the identity of the
winner is quasi-random (Lee, 2008).
The estimated model is :
yist = α+ τ ∗ femalelegislatorist + f(marginist) + εist (1)
where yist is average growth of light in constituency i in state s over the election term t. We
calculated the growth of light as the difference in the logarithm of light density in years t+ 1
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and t.The margin of victory in constituency i in state s for election in t (marginist) is the
forcing variable. Since we restrict the sample to elections in which the top two vote winners
are a man and a woman, marginist is defined as the difference between the vote shares of
the female and the male candidate. So, by construction, it is positive when a woman wins
against a male runner-up and negative when a male wins against a female runner-up. At a
(notional) margin of zero, the gender of the constituency leader changes discontinuously from
male to female. We can think of the treatment femalelegislatorist, as an indicator for the
winner being a woman, defined as follows:
femalelegislatorist = 1 if marginist > 0 (2)
= 0 if marginist ≤ 0,
The RD design considers a close neighbourhood, λ, around the threshold margin of zero
and premises that as λ goes to 0 the differences between constituencies that elected a female
candidate and those that elected a male vanish, allowing us to identify the causal effect of
electing a woman legislator:
lim
λ→0+
E[yist | 0 < marginist ≤ λ]− lim
λ→0−
E[yist | −λ ≤ marginist < 0] = τ, (3)
This is the difference in the average outcomes of constituencies that barely elected a female
legislator against a male runner-up and constituencies that barely elected a male legislator
against a female runner-up. The RDD assumption that the distribution of the error term,
εist, is continuous in the forcing variable is weaker than the identifying assumptions that other
selection-on-observables methods rely upon. Since there is no within election term variation in
our treatment variable (femalelegislatorist), we average the growth of light over an election
term. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level to allow for within constituency
correlation of the errors over different election terms.
We estimate the discontinuity using local linear regressions as suggested in Gelman and Im-
bens (2019). We report results for several bandwidth choices including the optimal bandwidth
procedure suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). In further robustness checks, we
retain only neighbours of female-led constituencies as any unobservable differences are likely
to be smaller and we investigate sensitivity of our results to an alternative definition of the
victory margin, using the larger sample of all races in which a female contested, irrespective
of whether or not she was ranked among the top two in voteshare (Meyerson, 2014). We also
show results conditional on party, allowing for measurement error and we show results for
the early vs late years of the electoral term. We then present estimates for spillovers and po-
tential mechanisms before investigating heterogeneity in impact. The empirical specifications
for these extensions of the main analysis are presented together with the findings below.
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4 Data
Table A.1 lists the sources and Table A.2 provides summary statistics of the main outcome
variables (Panel A) and the predetermined covariates (Panel B) in our data. It also provides
summary statistics for variables available from the candidate affidavits (Panel C). In this
section, we discuss the electoral data and the data on luminosity, road construction and
non-farm employment.
4.1 Night lights data
We use nighttime light imagery data gathered by satellites from the U.S. Air Force Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System. The data are processed by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency to exclude pixels with low quality data due to
clouds, stray light, lunar illuminance, auroral lights, and active fires. Annual composites are
produced by averaging across all remaining good quality data from across the calendar year.
Each pixel is encoded with a measure of its annual average brightness on a 6-bit scale from
0 to 63, and geo-referenced onto a 30 arc-second grid (approximately 1 km2 at the equator).
Night lights data were first digitized in 1992 and our electoral data run through to 2012.
We overlaid a map of 4265 Indian State Assembly constituencies to create constituency
level light density data as the sum of total light emitted by each pixel within constituency
boundaries divided by the area of the constituency. Figure A.2 shows considerable growth
in the intensity and spread of lit areas over time, consistent with the substantial economic
growth during this period.
To examine the relationship between growth in nighttime light output and economic growth,
we use state-level GDP data, which is the smallest administrative unit for which consistent
time series data are available. Figure A.3 plots the data, showing a strong correlation. Panel
data estimates, conditional on state and year fixed effects, indicate that a 1 percent increase
in night lights is associated with a 0.15 percent increase in GDP (see Appendix Table A.3).14
Henderson et al. (2012) argue that although GDP data is widely reported, it is often
unreliable in developing countries where accounting biases arise because the informal sector
is large, making it harder to verify inputs, outputs, incomes and profit (see also Jerven
(2013); Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte (2015)). Thus GDP and night lights are both error-
prone measures of economic activity, and it is unclear which is measured with more error.
14Using Indian district level GDP data that is available for a few recent years, Bickenbach et al. (2013)
estimate of elasticity of 0.107. Using global data, Henderson et al. (2012) estimate an elasticity of about 0.3.
Weidmann and Schutte (2017)) show that local level nighttime lights emissions are positively correlated with
economic wealth in a cross-section of clusters in the Demographic and Health Survey of 56 countries, the
average rank order correlation being 0.73. The last association is higher than in the preceding studies because
it is cross-sectional; within-cluster associations over time are smaller. Indeed, conditional on state but not year
fixed effects, our estimates of the association in Indian state-level panel data is 0.34.
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The compelling advantage of nighttime lights data, exploited here, is that it is available for
disaggregated areas and can be measured for state assembly constituencies.
We nevertheless consider three technical limitations of the sensor that may generate mea-
surement error in the use of night time lights to estimate economic activity: saturation, low
sensitivity and blooming. Saturation occurs because of the limited dynamic range of the
satellite sensor, leading to a limitation in recording high levels of brightness on the ground.
This results in data censoring, with the brightest pixels being assigned the highest digital
number value of 63 pixels. This is most common in the centers of large cities and will tend to
result in an underestimate of growth if growth occurs within city centers where light output
is saturated. On the other hand, the limited sensitivity of the sensors implies that dimly lit
areas are not detectable, and assigned a value of zero.15
In the close mixed-gender election sample, we have 7 cases (also 1% of observations) with
a luminosity of zero and also 7 cases of top-coding (1% of observations). In the robustness
checks section, we re-estimate the baseline model excluding these cases and, to anticipate
those results, they are very similar in magnitude and not statistically significantly different.
In the main analysis we have retained the top-coded cases and added 1 to each zero value
before taking logs. If instead we use the inverse hyperbolic transformation, we get similar
results, available on request.
The third potential source of measurement error is blooming, which refers to light output
from a brightly lit area dispersing over neighbouring areas. Blooming is most prominent
around the edges of large cities and can increase in the presence of nearby water sources
that reflect light into space. This decreases the precision of light output measurement. If
blooming occurs within constituencies, there is no problem. However, there is potential for
bias in our estimates if substantial increases in light output in bright constituencies spill
over into neighbouring constituencies. We will report a specification in which we estimate
spillovers to neighbouring constituencies, and discuss there a robustness check in which we
drop brightly lit areas to adjust for blooming.
Henderson et al. (2012) provide a detailed discussion of the satellite data, and the premise
for interpreting light growth as economic activity. As most lights observable from space are
from electric illumination, in principle, electricity consumption could be used to predict GDP
growth, but electricity data are unavailable at the constituency level both for India and more
generally. Among studies documenting an association of night lights and electricity use are
Chand et al. (2009); Shi et al. (2016); Xie and Qihao (2016), the first for India and the other
two on a global scale.
Electricity is the lifeblood of the modern economy. The quality and quantity of electricity
service provision, including hours of supply, are a known constraint on output, see Allcott et al.
15That said, Min et al. (2013) show that rural villages in Senegal with as few as 20 streetlights are detectable
in satellite imagery and, in another field test by Tuttle et al. (2014), light produced by a single 1000 watt high
pressure sodium lamp was reliably detected by the satellite.
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(2016); Dinkelman (2011); Rud (2006); Lipscomb et al. (2013).16 Politicians can influence
availability of electricity through providing more connections and ensuring higher reliability
(fewer power cuts), and electricity often features as one of the top priorities of Indian voters
in election surveys (Chhibber et al., 2004). A number of recent studies highlight the relevance
of political control over electricity distribution in India, see Burgess et al. (2020); Mahadevan
(2019); Dubash (2018); Kale (2014); Baskaran et al. (2015). However, none of these studies
is focused on distinguishing the behaviour of male and female politicians.
4.2 Election data
The election data are drawn from successive editions of the Statistical Reports on General
Elections to Legislative Assembly of States, published by the Election Commission of India.
For each election, the reports contain candidate names, vote counts, gender and party affilia-
tion; assembly constituency names and codes, year of the election, size of the electorate, total
number of votes cast, and number of valid votes. India currently has 29 states. Our data,
which cover about 99% of the population in India, include all states and the union territory
of Delhi, and exclude the disputed northern state of Jammu and Kashmir and smaller union
territories.17
A constitutional amendment in 1976 fixed the boundaries of constituencies until 2001 to
avoid adversely affecting representation of states that implemented population control mea-
sures. The fourth Delimitation Commission empowered by the Delimitation Act of 2002 set
out to redraw constituency boundaries based on the 2001 census data. However, the Com-
mission’s order was only accepted in 2008 and the first election to use new boundaries was
held in 2008 in the state of Karnataka. Due to non-comparability of the pre- and the post-
delimitation constituencies, we only consider elections held before 2008. However, our data
extend until 2012 for states which had not yet held new elections under the newly drawn
boundaries.18
In the analysis period, 1992-2012, there are 16,857 constituency-election years. Of these,
1,709 (10.3%) constituency-election years are in the mixed-gender sample, defined as a sample
16We note that Burlig and Preonas (2016) show that a rural electrification programme in India that acted
on the extensive margin had limited impacts on growth- this was, however, a programme targeting very poor
households
17In 2000, three states, namely Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, were partitioned to make
three additional states. The newly formed states are Chhattisgarh (from Madhya Pradesh), Jharkhand (from
Bihar), and Uttarakhand (from Uttar Pradesh). Chhattisgarh was allocated 90 constituencies from Madhya
Pradesh and Jharkhand was allocated 81 constituencies from Bihar. The constituencies themselves remained
unchanged. Uttarakhand was allocated 22 constituencies from Uttar Pradesh which were redrawn into 70 new
constituencies.
18The data include: Bihar till 2009, Assam, Kerala,Tamilnadu and West Bengal till 2010; Goa, Gujarat,
Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand till 2011; Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland, and Tripura till 2012. The remaining states appear in our sample till 2008.
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in which a woman and a man are the top two vote-winners.19 Among mixed-gender elections,
471 (27.6%) are close elections, defined as elections with a victory margin of less than 5%. In
fact a third of all Indian elections are won with a victory margin of less than 5%, a marker of
how competitive Indian elections are in general. So elections in which women contest against
men are, in general, neither more nor less competitive. Figure A.1 shows that constituencies
in which women win are fairly evenly distributed across the country, so our analysis does not
pertain to a specific region.20
We utilize data on candidate characteristics drawn from affidavits submitted to the Election
Commission of India. The submission of an affidavit became mandatory for all political
candidates following a Supreme Court of India order in 2003, the Right to Information Act.
The Election Commission of India publishes the affidavits and they contain information on
education, assets, liabilities, and pending criminal charges. The Association of Democratic
Reforms (ADR), an election watchdog, has compiled the information since 2004.21 The part
of the analysis using candidate characteristics is thus restricted to state elections held between
2004–2008, encompassing one election for each state.
4.3 Road construction data
We investigate acquisition and completion of federally awarded village road building contracts
as a proxy for public goods provision at the constituency level. We use administrative data on
a centrally sponsored rural roads construction program, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
(PMGSY), launched in 2000 that aims to provide all weather road connectivity in rural areas,
and forms an integral part of the Government of India’s poverty reduction strategy. This pro-
gram is unprecedented in its scale and scope (Aggarwal, 2017). We obtained road sanctioning
and completion dates. The data are available at the census block level, a sub-district census
administrative unit. We matched the roads data to state assembly constituencies.22
19It is notable that when a woman wins, in 91% of cases, the runner up is a man. However, when a man wins,
it is only in 6% of cases that the runner-up is a woman. This is because it is only in 30% of constituency-years
that at least one woman contests. The question of what inhibits women’s candidacy in India is discussed in
Bhalotra et al. (2017).
20There is a widespread perception that Indian women suffer discrimination on account of their gender. This
is true in many domains and Bhalotra et al. (2017) suggest that Indian women may face party bias in being
less likely to be put forward as candidates, as appears to be the case in Spain (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015).
However, they also show that, conditional upon contesting, women are more likely than men to win, which
undermines the possibility of voter bias against women.
21www.myneta.info first accessed in March 2014.
22The roads data are at http://omms.nic.in/, first accessed in May 2015. While there is significant geo-
graphical overlap between a census block and an assembly constituency (sharing on average 80% of villages),
a census block can span more than one assembly constituency. We assign block-level road variables to an
assembly constituency if the constituency contains at least 50% of villages in the block.
12
4.4 Non-farm employment data
In general, it is difficult to find conventional measures of economic activity such as GDP at
the constituency level, but luminosity can be mapped to any coordinates. Recently, Asher
et al. (2019) have made available constituency level data on non-farm employment. We use
this share as a proxy for economic activity. The data are drawn from the Socioeconomic High-
resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Data Platform for India (SHRUG), sourced from the 3rd
through the 6th rounds of the Economic Census of India, covering the years 1990, 1998,
2005, and 2013. The Economic Census is a complete enumeration of all non-crop producing
economic establishments in India including both public and private firms in the formal and
non-formal sectors. The SHRUG files are available aggregated at the constituency-year level.
Since the data are not annual, we assume that non-farm employment is constant between
rounds. This is not ideal but as it is difficult to obtain constituency level economic activity
data, we nevertheless use these data to provide a crude check on the luminosity data. As we
do not have total employment at the constituency level we normalise on constituency-level
population to arrive at the share of non-farm employment.
5 Results
5.1 Validity of RD Design
Validity of the RD design requires continuity of predetermined characteristics of constituencies
across the threshold of a zero victory margin. We use a rich set of variables determined before
the election in t, either variables from the previous election in (t − 1), or outcome variables
averaged over the previous electoral term. These include the growth of night lights, the share
of incomplete road projects, the share of non-farm employment, electorate size (i.e. number
of registered voters), number of candidates, turnout, female turnout, whether the legislator
was a woman, whether the legislator (in (t− 1)) was an incumbent, whether the head of the
winning party was a woman, as well as whether the constituency was reserved for lower castes
(Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes), aligned with the state government, and aligned with
the central government.
Figure 1 reports graphical evidence of the validity of the continuity assumption, and Table
A.4 shows tests of mean differences and the corresponding RD regression results. To elaborate
the graphs in Figure 1, consider Panel (a) which plots average growth of light output in the
previous election term against the margin of victory in t. The scatter plot depicts the local
averages of growth of light in each successive interval of 0.5% of the margin of victory. The
local linear curve is estimated using a triangular kernel and a 5% bandwidth and the 95%
confidence interval is shown. The average growth of light in the previous term is a continuous
function of the margin of victory. So there is no evidence here that women are more likely
to be elected in constituencies that were performing either less well or better on luminosity
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growth in the electoral term preceding their election. Put differently, the balance test shows us
that there is no differential pre-trend in the outcome in the “treated” constituencies (women
win) as compared with the “control” constituencies (men win). We also find balance on the
many other constituency characteristics listed above. Overall, the evidence suggests that only
the gender of the legislator changes abruptly at the zero margin of victory and that, therefore,
we can take the RD design as identifying the causal effect of the election of a woman.
Another RD validity check that we did is for sorting around the cutoff. Sorting has been
documented in the case of close elections between Republicans and Democrats in the United
States, and associated with manipulation of the margin of victory that renders the close
election experiment invalid (Snyder, 2005; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2012).
To investigate this, Figure A.4 depicts the density of the margin of victory as suggested
in McCrary (2008). There is no apparent discontinuity in the density around the cutoff.
The point estimate of the discontinuity is 0.043 with a standard error of 0.075. This suggests
there is no evidence of sorting in our sample of close mixed-gender races, and female and male
candidates are equally likely to win. Observe that Figure A.4 also shows that the distribution
of the margin by which women win is broadly similar to the distribution of the margin by
which men win in mixed-gender races.
5.2 Results: Legislator Gender and Economic Performance
In this section we present estimates of the causal effect of female relative to male legislators
on economic activity over the electoral term in the constituency from which they were elected.
The RD estimate of the impact of electing a woman rather than a man is the difference in
luminosity at the zero margin of victory.
The regression estimates are in Table 1. We estimate a local linear regression of growth of
night lights on the margin of victory in the RD framework. The bandwidth is calculated using
the optimal bandwidth procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). We
find that annual luminosity growth averaged over the electoral term is 15.25 percentage points
higher in constituencies in which a woman won by a small margin than in constituencies in
which a man won by a small margin, and this difference is significant at the 5% level (column
1). Using our estimate (from state-year data) of an elasticity of GDP to night lights of 0.15
(see Appendix Table A.3), a 15.25 percentage point difference in luminosity growth translates
into a 2.3 percentage point difference in GDP growth. Given that average growth in India
during the period of study was about seven percent per year, our estimates indicate that the
growth premium for constituencies stemming from them having a female legislator is about
32 percent.
The RD plot is in Figure 2, which depicts average growth in luminosity against margin
of victory. The data are averaged across bins that each cover 0.5 percentage points in the
margin of victory and provide local linear smooths of the underlying data using a bandwidth
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of 5 percent. We observe a discontinuous jump in light output at the threshold margin of
victory of zero, in line with the regression results. The graph plots coefficients for elections
with victory margins larger than the optimal RD bandwidth, where we see the difference even
out. These estimates are potentially contaminated by selection, but we provide an extensive
discussion of external validity in the penultimate section of the paper.
Sensitivity to bandwidth. Estimates using bandwidths that are half and twice the size of
the optimal bandwidth are in Columns (2)-(3) of Table 1. The estimated coefficient declines
as the bandwidth increases, but remains statistically significant. We do not expect coefficient
stability as we move outside the optimal bandwidth, but it is useful as a marker of how
selection sets in as we move away from the threshold, and we discuss this later. Column
(4) shows that estimates with a second order local polynomial smoother are similar to those
estimated with a local linear control function in Column (1). Gelman and Imbens (2019)
argue against the use of polynomials in RD of higher order than the quadratic.
Controlling for pre-determined covariates. While we have shown that pre-determined
covariates are balanced at the RD threshold, a straightforward test for the effect of any
imbalances is to directly control for pre-determined covariates. In Column (1) of Table 2,
we thus re-estimate our RD specification for the optimal bandwidth while controlling for the
pre-determined covariates discussed in Section 5.1 as well as constituency fixed effects. The
resulting estimate is 18.07 percentage points, which is statistically similar to the baseline
estimate.
Neighbour sample. We investigated the validity of the RD design using another strategy
as follows. The idea is that any (unobservable) imbalances between constituencies with female
and male legislators should be particularly small among neighbouring constituencies. We thus
re-estimate the main equation limiting the estimation sample to constituencies with female
legislators and their neighbours; see Column (2) of Table 2. The estimates are similar to
those in Table 1, which suggests the absence of significant imbalances.
Gender vs party. We may be concerned that we are capturing the effects of party of
the winning legislator rather than of their gender. This seems unlikely since we checked that
women are not significantly more likely to be from any one of the main parties. Nevertheless,
to investigate this concern, we included indicators for whether the legislator is from the
Congress or the BJP (with all other parties as the omitted category). The estimates are
robust to this (Column (3), Table 2).
All mixed gender elections. As a further sensitivity test, we estimated regressions with
a larger sample that includes all mixed-gender races in which a woman contested, rather than
just races in which a woman ranked among the top two, as in Meyerson (2014). The margin
of victory is again defined as the difference in the vote shares of the top-ranked female and
the top-ranked male candidate, except that now the top-ranked female may not be one of
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the top two vote-winners.23 The results are similar to those in Table 1; see Column (4) of
Table 2. This is because the victory margin in the additional races that are incorporated is
likely to be away from the discontinuity and hence unlikely to influence estimates that exploit
variation around the threshold of a zero victory margin.24
Trimming to address measurement error. In the Data section, we discussed that
luminosity data are subject to measurement error at the two ends of the distribution. To
address this we performed various checks. We dropped all constituencies that are top-coded
with respect to their luminosity, all observations with zero luminosity, and both top-coded
and zero luminosity constituencies. The estimates are essentially unchanged, see Columns
(5)-(7) of Table 2.
Distribution of effects through the electoral term. So as to investigate how the
growth effects of having a female rather than a male legislator evolve, we re-estimated the
model separating the first two years of growth from the last two years of growth in the electoral
term. The coefficients are imprecise in these split samples and not significantly different from
one another. However, the growth difference (between women and men) is more than twice as
large later in the electoral term, consistent with any legislator activity cumulating or taking
effect with an administrative lag (Table A.5).25
Non-farm employment share. Non-farm employment share is a proxy for structural
change, a process associated with economic growth as productivity in manufacturing and
services tends to be higher than in agriculture. Using recently available data on non-farm
employment at the constituency level we find that women perform better by 4% points over
the electoral term, or 0.84% points p.a., see Table 3. This result is also robust to using different
bandwidth choices and a local polynomial. Panel (a) in Figure 3 is the corresponding RD
plot, which displays a jump in non-farm employment at the threshold. Later we will show
that heterogeneity in impacts of legislator gender on luminosity is mirrored in heterogeneity
in impacts of legislator gender on non-farm employment share.
6 Spillovers
We have shown that women are more effective than men at raising growth in their own
constituencies. If this comes at the cost of lower growth in other constituencies, then effects of
23The margin is by construction positive for races in which women win. The runner up is typically the
top-ranked man, there being very few races in which the top two vote winners are women (bout 0.5% of all
the races in our time period) and negative for races in which men win.
24If we use the full sample of all elections and obtain OLS estimates conditional on constituency and year
fixed effects, we find no significant impact of legislator gender on growth. There is similarly no correlation
between parliamentarian gender and GDP growth in cross-country data, see Appendix Figure A.5). Thus the
causal effect of women on growth is not evident in observational data, and it is important to investigate this
relationship using techniques for causal identification in other settings.
25Compared with the term-averaged coefficient of 15.25 percentage points, we estimate 8.55 percentage
points in the first two years and 20.41 percentage points in the last two years.
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increasing the share of women on total growth are ambiguous. We therefore examine spillovers
to contiguous constituencies. Spillovers can, in principle, go in either direction. They may
be negative if legislators play a zero-sum game with fixed state resources. Alternatively
positive spillovers may arise for the following reasons. First, legislators may build roads or
electricity networks that continue across constituency boundaries, or road construction in
one constituency may increase access to markets in neighbouring constituencies. Second, the
success of women legislators may encourage yardstick competition if voters evaluate politicians
in their jurisdiction by comparing outcomes with those in neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley
and Case, 1995).
To implement this test, we define the dependent variable as light growth averaged over
neighbours of constituency j identified using a constituency map. The mean (s.d.) of number
of neighbours of a constituency is 5.8 (1.6).26 The independent variable of interest is as
before: the gender of the legislator in constituency j. The sample is still restricted to mixed
gender races for j, and we use the RD approach described for the main analysis. This yields
estimates of the difference in light growth in constituencies neighbouring female vs male led
constituencies.
The estimated coefficient is positive, but the difference is not significant (Panel A of Table
4). As discussed in the Data section, blooming in the night lights data could bias estimates
of geographic spillovers from highly luminous constituencies. To assess the potential of any
such bias to influence the estimates here, we dropped constituencies with top-coded light
levels, and the results are robust to this- see Panel B of Table 4. Overall, there is no evidence
of negative growth spillovers from female-led to neighbouring constituencies, allowing us to
conclude that women legislators have a positive impact on overall growth.
7 Mechanisms
7.1 Road Infrastructure
We first investigate a hard outcome that is growth producing. In general and especially
in developing countries, road infrastructure is a key ingredient to growth. Rural roads are
estimated to have significant positive effects on local economic outcomes including growth
and structural transformation, involving the decline of agricultural work in favour of wage
work (which we also capture in the share of non-farm employment) (Jacoby, 2000b; Shrestha,
2015; Jacoby and Minten, 2009; Casaburi et al., 2013; Asher and Novosad, 2019). In one of
the few previous studies that uses luminosity growth to measure changes in economic activity
26The reported results restrict to within-state neighbours as we analyse state legislators and the concern is
around competing demands on state budgets. However, if we relax this restriction, we get the same results, as
the mixed-gender ACs within the bandwidth we use are not at state borders.
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in India, Asher and Novosad (2019) estimate that construction of a village road increases
village-level luminosity by 2.5 percent per annum.27
We use administrative data from the Prime Minister’s Village Road Program (PMGSY)
described in Section 4.3. The PMGSY is a flagship programme that, between 2000 and 2015,
funded the construction of over 400,000 km of roads (in over 100,000 new roads), benefiting
almost 200,000 villages at a cost of almost 40 billion US dollars (Asher and Novosad, 2019).
It is a program of considerable political and economic significance and effective delivery of
this program is a good marker for public goods delivery, involving state legislators bidding
for federal funds and delivering goods at the local level. PMGSY is federally funded but
responsibility for road construction is delegated to state governments, and the program by
definition involves village-level roads.
Program eligibility involved the village having a population above 1000 till the year 2003 and
above 500 after then. Therefore validity of the RD design we use requires that constituencies
won by men vs women in close elections are not systematically different in population size,
in particular around these thresholds. Using the 2001 census files, and using both threshold
and average population figures at the village level, we test this premise just like we test for
continuity across the zero vote margin threshold for other constituency characteristics. The
results are in Appendix Table A.6 and show no significant differences in population size.
Using data for 2004–2012 and the RD approach used for the main analysis, we investigate
whether the share of incomplete roads relative to awarded road projects is a function of leg-
islator gender. Table 5 reports the point estimate of the discontinuity. We find no significant
difference in contracts allocated (Panel B of Table 5).28 However, the share of incomplete
roads is 22 percentage points lower in constituencies with female legislators (Panel A of Table
5). This difference is significant across a range of bandwidth choices and robust to replacing
the linear with a quadratic smoother.29 Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the RD plot of the share
of incomplete roads against the margin of victory. 30 We observe a discontinuous drop in
the share of incomplete roads at the threshold margin of victory of zero, in line with the
regression results.31
27On our sample we estimate a descriptive association using a fixed effects model- Table A.7 confirms that
it is positive and statistically significant.
28Okuyama (2018) finds that, contrary to a widespread concern in Japan that women are less qualified
politicians than men, legislator gender does not affect the size of per capita intra-governmental transfers.
29The mean number of road contracts won (by male and female legislators alike) in the close mixed-gender
election sample is 3.5. If an additional fifth of these is left incomplete in male-led constituencies, that implies
about 0.7 fewer roads on average. We also examined costs associated with a project and found no significant
differences in constituencies led by female and male legislators.
30The data are averaged across bins that each cover 0.5 percentage points in the margin of victory and
provide local linear smooths of the underlying data using a bandwidth of 5 percent.
31We re-estimate the impact of legislator gender on luminosity growth using the (smaller) data sample used
for analysis of road construction. See Panel A of Table A.8 where, in line with the results in Table 5, we find
an estimate of the same order of magnitude as in Table 1, albeit it is imprecise in this smaller sample.
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Our findings reject the presumption that men are more effective at delivering growth-
producing infrastructure. Since road construction in India has been shown to produce higher
returns in terms of job mobility for men than for women (Asher and Novosad, 2019), our
findings establish that women deliver public goods beyond those that serve the interests
of women. The qualities that lead women to achieve higher completion rates may include
efficiency, mission or lower corruption, all of which are related to effective delivery of public
goods. In the next section we examine corruption and in the section on external validity we
discuss evidence consistent with women legislators having greater intrinsic motivation than
men.32
7.2 Corruption in Office
Following Fisman et al. (2014), we use growth in assets during office as a proxy for corrup-
tion. Since assets are only recorded in affidavits submitted by candidates when standing for
election, Fisman et al. (2014), restrict the sample to candidates who contest for two consec-
utive elections, whether or not they win. They find higher asset growth for winners than
for runners-up in close races, estimated as a difference of 3 to 5% p.a. and interpret this as
evidence that politicians leverage public office for private benefits by engaging in rent-seeking
activities.33
Fisman et al. (2014) do not distinguish between male and female legislators. We adopt
their sampling and measurement strategy but rather than compare winners with runners up
in close races, we compare women who won in a close race with men who won in a close race.
Regression estimates are in Table 6. Column (1), using the IK bandwidth, shows that asset
growth during an electoral term is about 60 percentage points lower among female legislators.
This translates into a 12 percentage point per annum difference in the rate at which male vs
32We report results for roads because we have access to unusually good local-level data on a public infras-
tructure programme of large political and economic significance. We could not find similar data for other
infrastructure. In India, electricity is, like roads, an important state provided infrastructural good (Lal, 2005).
Refer discussion of electricity in the subsection on nightlights in the Data section above. When we use night
lights data as a proxy for economic activity it is implicit that it is a proxy for electricity demand, as this will
tend to scale with economic activity. However, to the extent that women legislators provide electricity better
(for the same reasons that they provide roads better), some of the better performance of women leaders may
reflect better electricity supply. As this is growth-producing, it does not substantively alter the interpretation
of the results.
33In a section labeled External Validity, they acknowledge potential selectivity into the two-contests sample
associated with a runner-up not re-contesting because they are hit by a negative wealth shock. They argue
that this will tend to create a downward bias, making the estimates conservative. The same applies in the
current analysis.
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female legislators accumulate rents in office.34 As a benchmark, note that the mean annual
growth rate of assets in the sample (averaging over all legislators) is 23 percentage points.35
If we half the bandwidth, this coefficient is similar but less precisely determined (column
2). If we double the bandwidth, the coefficient falls a bit more but is statistically significant.
The result is robust to replacing the linear with a quadratic polynomial (column 4). Across
the columns, the coefficients are not significantly different from the coefficient in the first
column. Panel (c) in Figure 3 plots asset growth between elections t and t+1 against the
margin of victory between winners and losers (of opposite gender) in election t, confirming a
discontinuity in asset growth at the zero margin of victory.36
Overall, this constitutes compelling evidence that women legislators are less likely than
men to exploit their office for personal financial gain. It indicates lower corruption as one
likely contributor to the economic advantage of women legislators given evidence that lower
corruption is conducive to economic growth (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Mauro,
1995; Prakash et al., 2019).
A possible take on our finding of lower corruption among women legislators is that they
tend to have less political experience and have not yet learned the ropes. If this were the case,
gender differences in corruption would disappear as women’s political tenure lengthens. We
respond to this potential concern in three ways. First, we note evidence that the association of
experience in politics with corruption is not necessarily positive.37 than gender were driving
this result, policies the world over that are introducing new women into politics will tend
to lead to lower corruption. Second, in the following section we investigate a measure of
corruption that is available before the candidate takes office. If we were to find gender
differences in this measure of criminality that project onto differences in growth once the
candidate is elected, this result would indicate a role for corruption that is independent of
34While Fisman et al. (2014) use growth in net assets (total assets minus total liabilities), we use growth in
gross assets because liabilities of Indian politicians may not reflect their actual net wealth. For example, with
reference to Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politicians can easily get loans from public sector
banks without paying them back. However, if we use net asset growth the results are similar- the coefficient
in column 1 is -0.5 instead of -0.6 and significant.
35There is no ready metric with which we can translate this difference in corruption to a difference in growth
to assess the share of the total growth difference it explains, but 12 percentage points is a large share of the
mean.
36We re-estimate the impact of legislator gender on luminosity growth within the subsample used for estab-
lishing the legislator gender on asset growth. See Panel B of Table A.8 which shows a large and positive effect
of female legislators on luminosity growth. This increases confidence in our suggestion that legislator identity
impacts on asset growth contribute to explaining their impacts on luminosity growth.
37Comparing women appointed to village council headship under quotas with men in unreserved seats in the
Indian state of Andhra, Afridi et al. (2017) find that they are initially more corrupt and they attribute this
to their being inexperienced and therefore subject to elite capture - indeed, by the end of their tenure women
are neither more nor less corrupt than men. Studying cross-sectional differences in different states, Beaman
et al. (2009) find women are less corrupt. These studies are not comparable to ours because we study women
competitively elected to state legislative assemblies. First, quotas distort quality, and may lead to ”‘lower
quality”’ women taking office (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). Second, state leaders are less vulnerable to
elite capture than village leaders (Bardhan et al., 2010). Direct comparison is further invalidated by these
studies having looked at particular states, whereas we analyse all-India data.
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legislator tenure. If at all, we may expect larger differences in pre-election characteristics if
politicians in office face stricter scrutiny and are subject to a re-election constraint which
encourages them to act in more accountable ways. Alternatively, they may develop a sense
of duty once they attain office if “office ennobles” (Brennan and Pettit, 2002; Benabou and
Tirole, 2003).38
7.3 Candidate Characteristics
In India, following passage of the Right to Information Act, all political candidates are re-
quired to file affidavits that include various information including whether or not they are
carrying pending criminal charges. Using these data, we compare characteristics of male and
female legislators in the analysis sample of mixed-gender close elections, see Appendix Figure
A.6 and Table A.9. In the close election sample (and also in the full sample of all mixed
gender elections), there is no significant difference in education and wealth between male and
female legislators. However, women legislators are significantly less likely than men to be
carrying criminal charges and slightly younger on average.
In the close election sample, about 10% of women legislators face pending charges39, in
contrast to about 32% of men.40 It seems plausible that legislators with a criminal record
are more likely to practice corruption, to have priorities other than economic development
and, to be less likely to provide a stable business environment for growth. Using the RD
approach developed in (Prakash et al., 2019) on the expanded set of states in our sample, we
estimate that luminosity growth is 16.8% points smaller in constituencies led by a legislator
carrying pending criminal charges. Scaling this (gender-neutral) estimate by the difference in
the propensity for criminality between men and women (a 21.8 percentage points difference
in our close election sample – see Table A.9) suggests that it can explain about 24% of the
estimated growth premium associated with women legislators.
While the validity of a close election design depends on balance in constituency character-
istics around the RD threshold (which we demonstrated above), it does not require balance
on candidate characteristics. In fact, if men and women were identical, then the question of
whether legislator gender influences economic performance would be void.41 However, if crim-
inality were to predict winning this could be problematic for our identification strategy. We
therefore examined this on the mixed-gender sample, and we find no evidence of it (Appendix
Table A.10).
38The two measures are related- although the coefficient is not statistically significant it is sizeable- legislators
who enter office carrying criminal charges experience higher asset growth if office.
39The criminal charges here refer to cases in which an indictment or a charge sheet has been filed. The
judicial process in India is very slow and most are never convicted.
40This is a larger difference than in the overall sample that includes elections won by a wide margin. In the
overall sample, male legislators are only twice as likely to be carrying charges.
41As with most studies of gender differences in outcomes, the design identifies systematic differences in
outcomes of men and women in elections in which their assignment as leaders is quasi-random. We additionally
confirm that, in close elections, they are balanced on education and wealth.
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Differences in criminality between men and women legislators are consistent with exper-
imental evidence that women are more risk-averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008)
and more patient (Silverman, 2003) since risk taking and high discount factors are positively
associated with crime (Mastrobuoni and Rivers, 2016). If experimental evidence captures
inherent personality traits, then differences in criminality are unlikely to erode over time, as
more women join politics, or as women acquire longer political tenure.
8 Heterogeneity
In this section we investigate differences in the relative performance of male and female
legislators in sub-samples distinguished by party alignment and gender of the state minister,
the education and incumbency status of the legislator and an indicator of human development
(a correlate of corruption) at the state level. The differences in coefficients reported in this
section are not statistically significant but, in most cases, are of a considerable magnitude. In
Appendix Table A.11, we repeat the exercise replacing luminosity with non-farm employment
share. It is striking that we find the same pattern of results.42
Party alignment and gender of state minister. State governments may have an
incentive to favor aligned politicians in allocation of public resources (Brollo and Nannicini,
2012; Asher and Novosad, 2017). If aligned legislators have more resources to work with and
if the growth results emerge from women legislators making better use of these resources,
then we should expect to see larger differences in female vs male led constituencies in the
sample of constituencies that is aligned. This is what we find. The difference between female
and male legislators is 50% larger in the aligned sample. Although the difference between the
two samples is not statistically significant, it is large. See columns 1-2, Table 7.43
On the other hand, if female chief ministers favor female legislators, women may outperform
men under female chief ministers not because they use resources better but because they are
favoured. To investigate this, we estimate the baseline RD specification on subsamples of
states ruled by female vs male chief ministers (column 3-4, Table 7). We find no evidence of
favoritism along the lines of gender. The sample with male chief ministers, which contains
85% of cases (states) exhibits a growth difference in favor of female legislators similar to
the full sample results, while the smaller female chief minister sample shows a small and
insignificant coefficient.44
Education, caste and incumbency of legislator. We showed earlier that there is on
average no significant difference in the level of education of female and male legislators in
42We do not show non-farm employment by caste because we do not have statistical power.
43The alignment status of a constituency may change within a term, for instance, if a coalition at the state-
level breaks down. To account for this we set the alignment dummy to equal one if the constituencies was
aligned throughout the term and to zero if it was either not aligned or aligned for part of the term.
44The shares of women and men in the estimation sample who are aligned is 54.8% and 40.7%. The shares
of women and men in states with a female chief minister is 8.3% and 11.1%.
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the close mixed-gender sample. So education is unlikely to be a mechanism. However, given
an interest in the relationship between politician education and policy choices (Besley et al.,
2011), we investigate whether the relative success of women emerges from samples of more or
less educated legislators. We separate the sample into constituencies led by legislators with
at least ten years of education vs those with less (column 5-6, Table 7). Growth in luminosity
is only higher in women-led constituencies in the sample in which leaders are more educated.
The results are similar if we cut at twelve years of education. Examining heterogeneity by
caste of the legislator (columns 7-8), we find that the growth premium derived from electing
women leaders is driven by high caste women. This is consistent with high caste women
being more educated.45 Finally, dividing the sample into incumbents and non-incumbents,
we identify a larger male-female growth difference among incumbents (columns 9-10). Our
proposed explanations of these results are speculative but they line up with our earlier results
in suggesting that women use available resources with more effect for growth than men, insofar
as their education and experience are such resources.
Institutional environment. If clean governance is a reason that women-led constituen-
cies experience higher growth, we may expect that women make a larger difference in insti-
tutional environments where (male-dominated) corruption is pervasive. Using the Human
Development Index as a proxy for the prevailing quality of government (Sen and Dreze, 2005)
and splitting the sample into states with HDI above or below the median value in 1999,
we find that women are only significantly better than men at producing growth in the less
developed states, where the coefficient is twice as large, see columns 9-10, Table 7.
8.1 External validity
Our first result, that luminosity growth is discontinuously lower when a man rather than
a woman wins by a narrow margin was displayed in Figure 2. The RD estimate shows a
statistically significant difference. However, Figure 2 also shows that outside the IK bandwidth
(which, as noted in the Tables, is roughly 6%) luminosity growth in constituencies won by
men vs women is similar (note that men do not do better at any victory margin). It is
not unusual that the causal RD estimates for close victory margins differ from the descriptive
estimates for non-close victory margins as the latter are potentially contaminated by selection.
We nevertheless discuss the external validity of our estimates, a common concern in the RD
domain.
First, we note that close mixed-gender elections in India are representative of all mixed-
gender elections. In particular, a third of all mixed-gender elections are within the optimal
bandwidth and about half have a victory margin of less than 10%. The median victory
margin is 10.5% for women and 10.4% for men in the entire sample (the 25th percentile is
45Given long-standing caste segregation in India, and that gender norms are stronger in high caste groups,
it may be that personality traits like an aversion to corruption exhibit a larger difference in the high caste
group- though this is admittedly no more than one rationalisation of the result.
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about 4% and the 75th percentile is about 19% for both female and male winners). This
directly diminishes concerns that our results have limited validity. Second, we consider why
men who win with narrow margins perform worse than men who win with wider margins to
address the concern that the poorer performance of men relative to women in close elections
stems from their being a bad lot.
Constituency characteristics. Constituencies won by men with narrow margins may
have been a bad selection compared with constituencies won by men with wider margins. For
example, they may have historically struggled with generating growth. However, the balance
plots in Figure 1 and the corresponding data in Panel A of Table A.12 show no meaningful
differences between these two sets of constituencies.46
Candidate characteristics including dynastic links. An alternative possibility is that
men who win in narrow races are selectively worse than men who win with wide margins.
We find no evidence of this using characteristics available in the affidavit data, including
education and wealth, see Panel B of Table A.12. Using data recently created by George
(2019), we compare the dynastic links of candidates, that is, whether a parent or spouse
preceded them in political office. We find that men who win in close elections are more likely
to have dynastic links (17.4%) than men who win with wide margins (13.6%). Since dynasts
are less effective leaders over an election term (George, 2019), this can explain their poorer
performance, evident in the dip to the left of the threshold in Figure 2. However, dynastic
links cannot explain the male-female performance gap in close elections. Using our RD design,
we show that the probability that the winner is a dynast is invariant to the victory margin
(Figure A.7). In close elections, the share of dynasts is 15.9% among women and 17.4% among
men, and the difference is not statistically significant.47
Unobservable candidate characteristics- quality. We further investigate if men who
win in close races are negatively selected on unobservables, adapting to our setting a test
proposed in George (2019). The idea is that candidates who win with a narrow margin -
relative to candidates who win with a wide margin- are either weaker candidates or unlucky.
The trick is to use swings in the state-level vote share of the candidate’s party to measure luck,
as aggregate party swings constitute a shock to the individual candidate’s victory margin.
The party swing of the winning candidate, Swingi, in a mixed-gender race is defined as follows:
Swingi = ∆Party of winning candidatet −∆Party of losing candidatet. (4)
46 Among constituencies which have at least one mixed-gender election, nearly 60% have had only one or
two mixed-gender elections over a period of three decades (Bhalotra et al., 2017). This suggests that the
RD estimates do not capture features specific to certain constituencies. Similarly, Figure A.1 showed that
constituencies in which women win against men by a narrow margin are not clustered but, rather, fairly evenly
distributed across the country.
47If the main results showing better performance of women who win close races were related to their dynastic
links then we would expect (Figure A.7) to mimic the patterns seen in Figure 2 with a discontinuity at the
threshold and a dip to the left of the threshold.
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∆t is the state-level vote share of candidate k’s party in the state election in t minus the
same share in the preceding state election in t-1. Swingi hence captures the swing experienced
by the party of the winning candidate i, relative to the party of the runner-up.48 Candidates
who win in a close race in a year with a positive net party swing (Swingi > 0) are a relatively
“bad” selection (they won with a narrow margin despite a positive party swing) and those
winning during a negative party swing are a relatively “good” selection. We estimate impacts
of legislator gender on luminosity growth for candidates winning during positive vs negative
swings. The estimates are similar and statistically indistinguishable, see Table A.13. This
makes it unlikely that candidate quality drives our results. Our main result is robust to
accounting for negative selection among men in close elections. Even if we focus only on good
candidates (who won despite a negative party swing), women perform better than men.
An alternative explanation. A potential explanation of the difference in outcomes of
close vs non-close elections is that legislators who win in close races face more stringent
electoral incentives than those who win with comfortable margins (because their re-election
is more uncertain). That politicians pursuing a narrow electoral agenda have an incentive
to distort economic policies has been discussed in a literature on distributive politics, which
highlights this as a drawback of democratic politics (see e.g. Mani and Mukand (2007);
Cole (2009); Golden and Min (2013)). Politicians may induce electoral cycles, engage in
vote buying, or target resources to key electoral groups for purely electoral reasons; see Cole
(2009); Mitra et al. (2017); Arulampalam et al. (2009) for evidence from India. With the
exception of Brollo and Troiano (2016), this literature provides limited evidence of whether
men are more likely than women to fall prey to electoral incentives.
We argue that if men are more opportunistic than women then we may expect the pattern
seen in Figure 2. We find (descriptive) support for this in comparing re-election rates of men
and women in the mixed-gender election sample, see Table A.14. Men and women elected
with wide margins are equally likely to be re-elected, the chances being 30%-35%. Among
legislators who win in close races, men have a similarly high re-election rate of 27%, but
women have a substantially lower re-election rate of about 18%, despite their better growth
performance.49 These estimates are consistent with women being less likely to engage in
economic distortions even if it costs them electoral defeat. The results generalize in the
sense that if a non-close man were to find himself in a close election, he would also behave
opportunistically. We note again that close elections are not special cases, a third of all
elections being close.
48We obtain data on state-level party vote shares for all state elections during 1980-2008 from Jensenius and
Vernier (2017),https://www.francesca.no/data-2. The results are robust to leaving out the index candidate’s
voteshare when estimating the state-party level swing.
49These figures refer to the unconditional re-election probability. The results are similar for the probability
of re-election conditional on re-contesting. Conditional on re-contesting, comfortably elected men and women
have a similar re-election probability of about 50%-55%. Barely elected men also have a high re-election
probability of 44%, while barely elected women have a re-election probability of 29%. We do not observe any
meaningful difference in the likelihood of re-running among barely and comfortably elected men and women.
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There are other possible explanations of lower growth in competitive constituencies with
male legislators. One is that politicians with shorter expected tenure have less influence over
the promotion of bureaucrats. In line with this, Nath (2016) shows that the performance of
bureaucrats is worse in such constituencies. Women may be able to improve bureaucratic
performance even without explicit control over promotions if they are more efficacious or
intrinsically motivated. For instance, our result that road completion rates are higher in
constituencies with female legislators is consistent with women exerting more effort to monitor
bureaucrats effectively.50
9 Conclusion
We estimate that women legislators in India raise economic growth (GDP) in their constituen-
cies by 2.3 percentage points per annum more than male legislators. We find no evidence of
negative spillovers from female-led constituencies, which suggests considerable overall growth
gains. These are, as far as we know, the first causal estimates of the impact of legislator
gender on economic activity.
Investigating mechanisms we find that women legislators are more effective at overseeing
completion of road infrastructure projects (the share of incomplete projects being 22 percent-
age points lower), less likely to rent-seek while in office (personal asset growth is about 12
percentage points p.a. lower), and only about a third as likely as men to be carrying pending
criminal charges when they enter office. We also find evidence consistent with women legisla-
tors being less likely than men to distort economic policies in order to achieve electoral gains.
Thus it seems that economic activity improves under women legislators on account of them
being more efficacious, less corrupt and more intrinsically motivated.
A lower initial share of women in government implies that the marginal female entrant will
be higher ability than the marginal male entrant (also see Besley et al. (2017)), and this may
be reinforced by discrimination against women. Against this, as the share of women grows,
average female tenure will fall. Our results are consistent with female politicians having higher
ability.51 Our findings are potentially relevant to the many (richer and poorer) countries in
the world that have a small but growing share of women in the legislature.
To the extent that opportunities for corruption decline with development, any female-
advantage that derives from lower corruption will tend to dissipate with development. In line
with this, we found some evidence that the gender gap in legislator performance is smaller
in the more developed states of India but, in general, it is unclear that these differences will
50Anecdotes and media coverage in India often highlight that women in Indian politics are mission oriented,
see for instance, https://www.thebetterindia.com/4721/mla-jyoti-how-an-abandoned-musahar-girl-stepped-
on-to-the-political-stage/ and https://www.dnaindia.com/ahmedabad/report-once-jobless-phd-woman-slays-
5-time-bjp-mla-from-unjha-2569652.
51This result is non-trivial because we do not know a priori whether the underlying ability distribution is
the same for men and women, and we do not know how unobserved ability vs tenure translate into growth.
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disappear altogether if lower criminality and corruption are intrinsic to women. In addition,
gender differences in intrinsic motivation may persist. Overall, our analysis suggests that
differences in economic performance by legislator gender may narrow but not necessarily
close with economic development. Further work in other settings is merited.
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Table 1: Legislator Gender and Luminosity Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local 
Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female Legislator 15.25** 16.97* 8.52** 17.11*
[6.12] [8.96] [3.79] [9.42]
R 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
N 584 316 980 584
Bandwidth 6.68 3.34 13.36 6.68
Local Linear 
Growth of Lightt+1 
The dependent variable is the growth of light, (Log(Lightt+1 +1)−
Log(Lightt + 1)) ∗ 100, per year (averaged over an election term).
FemaleLegislatort is a dummy variable which is 1 for a female leg-
islator and 0 for a male legislator in mixed gender races in which a
female either won or was a runner-up against a male. The forcing
variable is margin of victory in t (margint), which is the differ-
ence between the vote shares of the female and male candidate in
mixed gender races. Column (1) reports estimates from a local
linear regression of growth of light on FemaleLegislatort, using a
bandwidth determined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) opti-
mal bandwidth calculator. Columns (2) and (3) halve and double
the optimal bandwidth. Column (4) uses a local quadratic smooth-
ing function. The following is true for this and all subsequent tables
unless noted otherwise. The kernel used is triangular. The standard
errors are clustered at the constituency level. The number of obser-
vations with in the given bandwidth is denoted by N. The symbols















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Legislator Gender and Non-Farm Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local 
Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female Legislator 4.19*** 4.82*** 2.89*** 4.28**
[1.33] [1.78] [1.00] [1.81]
R 2 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.08
N 160 76 263 160
Bandwidth 5.39 2.69 10.78 5.39
Local Linear 
Nonfarm employment / total populationt+5
The dependent variable is the share of non-farm employment in the con-
stituency population averaged over the election term. FemaleLegislatort is a
dummy variable which is 1 for a female legislator and 0 for a male legislator in
mixed gender races. Column (1) reports estimates from a local linear regres-
sion of share of non-farm employment on FemaleLegislatort, using Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth calculator. The forcing variable
is margin of victory in t (margint), which is the difference between vote shares
of the female and male candidates in mixed gender races. Columns (2) and (3)
halve and double the optimal bandwidth. Column (4) uses a local quadratic
smoothing function. See also Notes to Table 1.
Table 4: Spillovers to Neighbouring Constituencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local 
Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female Legislator 2.83 0.89 1.6 1.46
[1.76] [2.39] [1.26] [2.54]
R 2 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
N 576 309 965 576
Bandwidth 6.63 3.31 13.25 6.63
Female Legislator 2.81 1.19 1.53 1.82
[1.75] [2.37] [1.26] [2.53]
R 2 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
N 585 314 972 585
Bandwidth 6.87 3.43 13.74 6.87
Neighbor Average Growth of Lightt+1 
Local Linear 
Panel A: All constituencies
Panel B: Without top-coded constituencies
In Panel A the dependent variable is defined as the average growth of light, (Log(Lightt+1 + 1) −
Log(Lightt + 1)) ∗ 100, in neighbouring constituencies, averaged over an election term. Panel B
excludes any constituency-year observations that have top-coded light values. See also Notes to
Table 1.
Table 5: Legislator Gender and Road Completion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female Legislator -0.22* -0.26* -0.17* -0.35*
[0.12] [0.15] [0.08] [0.18]
R 2 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.05
N 122 63 226 122
Bandwidth 3.29 1.64 6.58 3.29
Female Legislator -1.13 -1.38 -0.88 -1.08
[0.85] [1.12] [0.69] [1.25]
R 2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
N 255 134 435 255
Bandwidth 6.11 3.05 12.21 6.11
Local Linear
Road Projects
Panel A: Share of Incomplete Road Projects
Panel B: Number of Road Projects Awarded
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the share of projects that remain incomplete
in total projects awarded, averaged over an election term and in Panel B, the de-
pendent variable is the number of projects awarded. FemaleLegislatort is a dummy
variable which is 1 for a female legislator and 0 for a male legislator in mixed gender
races in which a female either won or was a runner-up against a male. Column (1)
reports estimates from a local linear regression of share of incomplete road projects
on FemaleLegislatort, using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth
calculator. The forcing variable is margin of victory in t (margint), which is the
difference between vote shares of the female and male candidates in mixed gender
races. Columns (2) and (3) halve and double the optimal bandwidth. Column (4)
uses a local quadratic smoothing function. See also Notes to Table 1.
Table 6: Legislator Gender and Asset Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local 
Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female Legislator -0.60** -0.49 -0.31* -0.46
[0.26] [0.27] [0.16] [0.43]
R 2 0.14 0.31 0.02 0.22
N 59 27 111 59
Bandwidth 3.64 1.82 7.29 3.64
Growth of Assets
Local Linear 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of a legislator’s assets over
the election term, (Log(Assetst+1 + 1) − Log(Assetst + 1)). The
sample only considers legislators who re-contest the next election.
FemaleLegislatort is a dummy variable which is 1 for a female leg-
islator and 0 for a male legislator. The standard errors are clustered at
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(h) Female legislator in t-1
Each variable is plotted against female margin of victory in mixed gender races, which is the
difference between vote shares of a female candidate and male candidate in mixed gender races.
Mixed gender races are in which a woman either won or was a runnerup against a man. (Continued
on the next page)
















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)
















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)













-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)













-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)
















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)

















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)

















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)

















-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
margin of victory (%)
(p) Aligned with central government in t-1
By construction, margin of victory is positive for female legislators and negative for male legislators.
Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 percent margin of victory. The solid lines are
the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on margin of victory
separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, triangular kernel and a 5 percent bandwidth. The
figures also depict a 95 percent confidence interval for each variable around the solid curve.
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The dependent variable is the growth of light averaged over an election term against female margin
of victory in mixed gender races. The victory margin is the difference between the vote shares of the
female and male candidate in mixed gender races. These are races in which a man and a woman are
the top two vote-winners. By construction, the margin of victory is positive when women win and
negative when men win. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 percent margin of victory.
The solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on
margin of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, using a triangular kernel and a 5
percent bandwidth. The figures also depict a 95 percent confidence interval for each variable around
the solid curve.
44
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(c) Asset Growth
The dependent variable is the share of non-farm employment in Panel (a), the share of incomplete
roads in Panel (b), and Asset growth in Panel (c). In Panel (c) the sample is restricted to candidates
who re-contest the next election. Each variable is plotted against female margin of victory in mixed
gender races, which is the difference between vote shares of a female candidate and male candidate
in mixed gender races. Mixed gender races are in which a woman either won or was a runnerup
against a man. By construction, the margin of victory is positive when women win and negative
when men win. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 percent margin of victory. The
solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on margin
of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, using a triangular kernel and a 5 percent



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Luminosity Elasticity of GDP
(1) (2) (3)
Log Light Per Capita 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.15***
[0.11] [0.09] [0.04]
Method OLS FE FE with Year Dummies
R 2 0.28 0.82 0.98
N 474 474 474
Log(State GDP Per Capita)
The above is a panel of 29 Indian states over the period 1992-2009.
The standard errors are clustered at the state level and are in the
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: Legislator Gender- Impacts over the Legislative Term
(1) (2) (3)
IK (h) h/2 2h
Female Legislator 8.55 12.49 3.1
[6.66] [10.32] [5.43]
R 2 0 0.01 0
N 811 475 1,208
Bandwidth 11.86 5.93 23.72
Female Legislator 20.41 30.47 7.03
[15.38] [25.09] [10.33]
R 2 0.01 0.01 0
N 617 345 1,007
Bandwidth 8.82 4.41 17.63
Local Linear 
Panel A: First Two Years
Panel B: Last Two Years
In Panel A the dependent variable is the average growth rate for first
two years of an election term. In Panel B the dependent variable is the
average growth rate for the last two years of an election term. Column
(1) runs a local linear regression using the optimal bandwidth calcu-
lator. Columns (2) and (3) halve and double the optimal bandwidth.
See also Notes to Table 1.




Proportion of Villages 
with Population>=500
Proportion of Villages 
with Population>=1000
Female Legislator 155.15 -0.08 0.01
[500.07] [0.10] [0.12]
R 2 0 0.05 0.01
N 281 72 104
Bandwidth 10.07 2.28 3.23
The village population data is from 2001 census. FemaleLegislatort is a dummy
variable which is 1 for a female legislator and 0 for a male legislator in mixed
gender races. The forcing variable is margin of victory (margint), which is
the difference between vote shares of the winning and runnerup candidates in
mixed gender races. Column (1) reports estimates from a local linear regression
of average village population on FemaleLegislatort using a bandwidth deter-
mined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth calculator. The
dependent variables are proportion of villages with population of 500 or more
in Column (2) and proportion of villages with population of 1000 or more in
Column (3). See also Notes to Table 1.
Table A.7: Associations of Alternative Outcomes with Luminosity Growth
(1) (2)
Share of Incomplete Projects -11.15* -23.86**
[6.74] [11.41]
R 2 0.03 0.32
N 561 561
Method OLS FE
Growth of Assets -3.09** -1.64
[1.45] [1.19]
R 2 0.01 0.26
N 258 258
Method OLS OLS
Share Non-farm Employment 1.12*** 2.07*
[0.41] [1.17]







Panel C: Non-farm 
Employment
FE refers to fixed effects, which are constituency and elec-
tion term fixed effects. In the regressions for road comple-
tion, both columns control for the number of road projects
awarded, the regressions for asset growth control for the
baseline level of assets. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses and are clustered at the constituency level in Panels
A and C, and at the state level in Panel B. The symbols
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Table A.8: Legislator Gender and Luminosity Growth in Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local 
Quadratic
IK (h) h/2 2h IK (h)
Female 
Legislator 21.75 4.7 18.97 3.91
[17.20] [17.08] [11.67] [20.44]
R 2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
N 122 63 226 122
Bandwidth 3.29 1.64 6.58 3.29
Female 
Legislator 55.61* 58.74 32.62* 62.84
[32.49] [65.20] [18.28] [68.70]
R 2 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.13
N 59 27 111 59
Bandwidth 3.64 1.82 7.29 3.64
Panel A: Incomplete Road Projects Subsample
Panel B: Growth of Assets Subsample
Growth of Lightt+1 
Local Linear 
This table replicates the results in Table 1 for the subsamples used for the
results in Panel A of Table 5 (legislator gender and road completion) and








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Mixed Gender Sample
This table estimates how having pending criminal accu-
sations at the time of contesting an election affects the
probability of winning. In Panel A, the sample is races in
which a candidate with criminal accusations either won
or was the runnerup against a candidate with no accusa-
tions. In Panel B, we consider close close races with a vic-
tory margin of 5% or less in which a candidate with crim-
inal accusations either won or was the runner-up against
a candidate with no accusations. The dependent vari-
ables is a dummy variable which is 1 if a candidate wins
and 0 otherwise. Criminal is a dummy variable which is
1 if a candidate has any criminal charges against him or



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.12: Balance in Constituency and Candidate Characteristics: Close vs. non-close
and mixed gender vs. non-mixed gender constituencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Close Non-Close Difference Close Non-Close Difference Close
Non-
Close Difference
Growth of Light Density t-1 3.293 5.974 -2.681 3.511 8.008 -4.497 3.048 3.681 -0.633
(30.222) (38.854) (2.277) (30.140) (46.041) (3.605) (30.402) (28.549) (2.632)
Share Incompete Projects t-1 0.026 0.034 -0.008 0.047 0.025 0.022 0.003 0.043 -0.040
(0.129) (0.143) (0.017) (0.175) (0.097) (0.022) (0.021) (0.174) (0.026)
Lag Share Nonfarm Employmen 1.459 1.488 -0.029 1.579 1.462 0.117 1.296 1.517 -0.221
(0.623) (0.600) (0.104) (0.657) (0.615) (0.144) (0.547) (0.588) (0.150)
Log Electors t-1 11.817 11.793 0.024 11.818 11.761 0.058 11.815 11.828 -0.013
(0.601) (0.613) (0.037) (0.577) (0.669) (0.053) (0.630) (0.542) (0.050)
Number Candidates t-1 10.566 11.679 -1.114 10.560 12.459 -1.900 10.573 10.832 -0.259
(7.128) (34.992) (1.868) (7.274) (47.979) (3.471) (6.975) (7.428) (0.671)
Turnout t-1 65.868 65.087 0.781 66.104 65.372 0.732 65.588 64.766 0.822
(10.941) (11.975) (0.702) (10.427) (11.668) (0.927) (11.542) (12.316) (1.069)
Female Turnout t-1 61.770 60.726 1.045 62.262 60.842 1.420 61.192 60.599 0.593
(12.929) (13.332) (0.827) (12.285) (12.813) (1.084) (13.662) (13.887) (1.269)
Female MLA t-1 0.306 0.255 0.050* 0.301 0.213 0.088** 0.311 0.303 0.008
(0.461) (0.436) (0.027) (0.460) (0.410) (0.035) (0.464) (0.460) (0.041)
Incumbent t-1 0.697 0.684 0.014 0.684 0.717 -0.033 0.713 0.648 0.065
(0.460) (0.465) (0.029) (0.466) (0.451) (0.039) (0.454) (0.478) (0.043)
Female Party Head t-1 0.202 0.150 0.052** 0.202 0.165 0.037 0.201 0.133 0.068**
(0.402) (0.357) (0.023) (0.403) (0.372) (0.033) (0.402) (0.340) (0.033)
SC-reserved Constituency t-1 0.195 0.205 -0.010 0.171 0.198 -0.027 0.223 0.214 0.010
(0.397) (0.404) (0.024) (0.377) (0.398) (0.032) (0.418) (0.410) (0.036)
ST-reserved Constituency t-1 0.113 0.131 -0.018 0.114 0.146 -0.032 0.112 0.113 -0.002
(0.317) (0.337) (0.020) (0.318) (0.353) (0.028) (0.316) (0.317) (0.028)
Aligned with State Govt t-1 0.607 0.656 -0.049* 0.619 0.671 -0.053 0.593 0.639 -0.046
(0.477) (0.469) (0.028) (0.474) (0.464) (0.038) (0.482) (0.474) (0.042)
Aligned with Central Govt t-1 0.353 0.336 0.017 0.322 0.356 -0.034 0.390 0.314 0.076**
(0.410) (0.402) (0.024) (0.410) (0.412) (0.034) (0.408) (0.389) (0.035)
INC Legislator t-1 0.259 0.284 -0.025 0.275 0.297 -0.022 0.240 0.269 -0.029
(0.439) (0.451) (0.027) (0.448) (0.457) (0.037) (0.428) (0.444) (0.039)
BJP Legislator t-1 0.172 0.182 -0.011 0.147 0.178 -0.031 0.201 0.188 0.013
(0.378) (0.386) (0.023) (0.355) (0.383) (0.030) (0.402) (0.391) (0.035)
Educated 0.818 0.855 -0.037 0.870 0.889 -0.019 0.762 0.818 -0.056
(0.387) (0.353) (0.039) (0.339) (0.315) (0.047) (0.429) (0.387) (0.061)
MLA's Age 47.246 48.582 -1.336 48.671 50.185 -1.514 45.646 46.899 -1.253
(10.691) (9.818) (1.048) (9.939) (9.537) (1.386) (11.341) (9.861) (1.556)
Total Assets ('000 Rs.) 6902.366 11338.543 -4436.177 6061.714 8202.431 -2140.717 7859.415 14815.537 -6956.121
(11914.105) (32770.404) (2867.379) (9860.372) (16893.489) (2120.832) (13907.696) 43970.661) (5587.216)
Total Liability ('000 Rs.) 732.233 665.473 66.760 724.553 544.983 179.570 741.619 792.765 -51.146
(2406.121) (3559.485) (358.284) (2337.882) (1174.566) (249.937) (2509.085) (4967.294) (713.294)
Criminal 0.224 0.212 0.012 0.321 0.268 0.053 0.103 0.148 -0.045
(0.418) (0.409) (0.040) (0.470) (0.444) (0.059) (0.306) (0.356) (0.049)
WomenAll Men 
Panel B: Candidate Characteristics
Panel A: Predetermined Constituency Characteristics
Columns (1)-(3) compare mixed gender races in which victory margin was within 5% (close races) with mixed
gender races with a larger victory margin (non-close races). Columns (4)-(6) further break down close races
by the gender of the legislator. Columns (7)-(9) compare non-close races by the gender of the legislator.
Standard deviations in parentheses except in columns (3) and (6) which have standard errors in parentheses.
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels from tests of no differences
, respectively.









R 2 0.03 0.04
N 405 255
Bandwidth 7.2 9.37
Growth of Lightt+1 
This table replicates the results in column (1) of Table
1 for subsamples of candidates with postive (model 1)
and and negative party swings (model 2). Negative
and positive party swings are defined based on Equa-
tion 4. See also Notes to Table 1.
Table A.14: Re-contest and Re-election Rates by Legislator Gender and Whether Close
Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Difference Female Male Difference
Prob(Winning) 0.180 0.267 -0.087* 0.316 0.356 -0.040
(0.385) (0.444) (0.047) (0.465) (0.479) (0.027)
Prob(Winning|Rerunning) 0.290 0.435 -0.145** 0.524 0.558 -0.033
(0.456) (0.498) (0.069) (0.500) (0.497) (0.037)
Rerunning 0.621 0.613 0.008 0.602 0.637 -0.036
(0.487) (0.489) (0.055) (0.490) (0.481) (0.028)
Close Non-close
Columns (1)-(3) compare the likelihood that an incumbent legislator reruns and gets reelected after mixed-gender
races in which victory margin was within 5% (Close races). Column (4)-(6) compare the likelihood of re-running
and re-election after mixed-gender races with a larger victory margin (Nonclose races). The symbols *, **, and ***


































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2: Luminosity in India.
 
(a) Luminosity in 1992
 
(b) Luminosity in 2009
Note: Subfigures (a) and (b) show the level of average luminosity in India in 1992 and
2009, respectively. The average growth rate of GDP in India during this period was
about 120%. Source for all figures: DMSP-OLS v4 Time Stable Annual Composites
from NOAA National Geophysical Data Center.
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Note: Scatter of log of night lights per capita and log of GDP per capita, both using the state
population in the denominator. The time period is 1992-2009.
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(b) McCrary’s Density Test
The figures plot the density of the margin of victory, which is the difference between vote shares
of the female and male candidates in mixed gender races. Mixed gender races are defined as those
in which a man and a woman rank in the top two. By construction, margin of victory is positive
for female legislators and negative for male legislators. The magnitude of the discontinuity (log
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(e) Criminal
Each variable is plotted against female margin of victory in mixed gender races, which is the
difference between vote shares of a female candidate and male candidate in mixed gender races.
Mixed gender races are in which a woman either won or was a runnerup against a man. By
construction, margin of victory is positive for female legislators and negative for male legislators.
Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 percent margin of victory. The solid lines are
the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on margin of victory
separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, triangular kernel and a 5 percent bandwidth. The
figures also depict a 95 percent confidence interval for each variable around the solid curve.
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This figure plots a dummy indicating whether a MLA is a dynast against female margin of victory
in mixed gender races, which is the difference between vote shares of a female candidate and male
candidate in mixed gender races. Mixed gender races are in which a woman either won or was a
runnerup against a man. By construction, margin of victory is positive for female legislators and
negative for male legislators. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 percent margin
of victory. The solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each
variable on margin of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, triangular kernel and
a 5 percent bandwidth. The figure also depicts a 95 percent confidence interval for each variable
around the solid curve.
